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Abstract
The empirical literature on democracy and human rights has made great strides over the last 30 years in explaining (1) the
variation in the transition to, consolidation of, and quality of democracy; (2) the proliferation and effectiveness of hu-
man rights law; and (3) the causes and consequences of human rights across many of their categories and dimensions.
This work has in many ways overcome the ‘essentially contested’ nature of the concepts of democracy and human rights
conceptually, established different measures of both empirically, and developed increasingly sophisticated statistical and
other analytical techniques to provide stronger inferences for the academic and policy community. This article argues that
despite these many achievements, there remain tensions between conceptualisations of democracy and human rights
over the degree to which one includes the other, the temporal and spatial empirical relationships between them, and
the measures that have been developed to operationalize them. These tensions, in turn, affect the kinds of analyses that
are carried out, including model specification, methods of estimation, and findings. Drawing on extant theories and mea-
sures of both, the article argues that there must be greater specificity in the conceptualisation and operationalization of
democracy and human rights, greater care in the development and use of measures, and greater attention to the kinds of
inferences that are made possible by them.
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1. Introduction
In 1971, Robert Dahl published Polyarchy in which he
set out a systematic framework for measuring and un-
derstanding two fundamental dimensions of democ-
racy: contestation and inclusiveness. The combination of
these two dimensions allowed for comparative analysis
of a variety of regime types around the world, while nor-
matively his concept of ‘polyarchy’, which included coun-
trieswith a high degree of contestation and a high degree
of inclusiveness, was argued to be themost preferred sys-
tem of governance. In 1988, Neil Mitchell and James Mc-
Cormick published one of the first systematic compara-
tive analyses of human rights in the journal World Poli-
tics, which explained the cross-national variation in the
protection of civil and political rights. Both of these pub-
lications and analyses relied on (1) systematic theorisa-
tion of the concepts under inquiry, (2) methods for mea-
suring the concepts, and (3) analysis of variation and co-
variation within and between the measures across coun-
try cases (see Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 531; Landman
& Carvalho, 2009, pp. 32–34). Since these seminal publi-
cations on the empirical analysis of democracy and hu-
man rights, there have been countless studies on the
(1) the variation in the transition to, consolidation of, and
quality and performance of democracy; (2) the prolifer-
ation and effectiveness of human rights law; and (3) the
causes and consequences of human rights across many
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of their different categories and dimensions (see Land-
man, 2005b, 2009, 2013).
This kind of work has in many ways overcome the ‘es-
sentially contested’ (Gallie, 1956) nature of democracy
and human rights conceptually, established different and
highly varied measures of both, and developed increas-
ingly sophisticated statistical and other analytical tech-
niques that provide stronger inferences for the academic
and policy community. This article argues that despite
thesemany achievements, tensions remain between the-
ories of democracy and human rights over the degree
to which one includes the other, the temporal and spa-
tial empirical relationships between and among them,
and the measures that have been developed to opera-
tionalize them. These tensions, in turn, affect the kinds
of analyses that are carried out, including model spec-
ification, methods of estimation, and findings. Drawing
on extant theories and measures of both, the article ar-
gues that there must be greater specificity in the con-
ceptualisation and operationalization of democracy and
human rights, care in the development and use of mea-
sures, and more attention to the kinds of inferences that
they make possible.
The overall motivation for this article is to provide
clarity about what we mean when we talk about democ-
racy and human rights, the degree to which they might
share certain but not all attributes, and to unpack the
conceptual and empirical relationships that are evident
between them. Establishing conceptual clarity informs
our consideration of measurement strategies and conse-
quently any empirical relationships between democracy
and human rights that might be discovered. It is impor-
tant not to conflate or elide democracy and human rights.
It is equally important to show how, why, and to what de-
gree the two are inter-related, focusing on the direction,
magnitude, and significance of the relationship, while at
the same time remaining conscious that such relation-
ships to date fall far below perfect correlation. This em-
pirical gap between democracy and human rights is cru-
cial for understanding the political challenge of progress-
ing human rights to be closer to their legal ideal.
In order to develop these arguments, the article is
structured in four sections. The first section provides a
brief overviewof the definition of democracy and human
rights to show where and how the two concepts have
a variable degree of overlap with one another. The sec-
ond section shows the different strategies for measuring
democracy and human rights, including (1) events-based
data, (2) ‘standards-based’ data, (3) survey based data,
(4) socio-economic and administrative data and (5) big
data analytical techniques. The third section provides an
overview of many of the stylized facts about the empir-
ical relationships between measures of democracy and
human rights, as well as the tendency for empirical stud-
ies to use human rights measures as measures of democ-
racy, repression, rule of law, and good governance. The
discussion shows how the associations made in theory
can be tested empirically. The final section examines
the remaining challenges and limitations to the current
state of measurement and analysis of democracy and hu-
man rights.
2. Democracy and Human Rights
Democracy and human rights are grounded in the shared
principles of accountability, individual liberty, integrity,
fair and equal representation, inclusion and participa-
tion, and non-violent solutions to conflict. Modern con-
ceptions of democracy are based on the fundamental
ideas of popular sovereignty and collective decisionmak-
ing in which rulers through various ways are held to ac-
count by those over whom they rule (see Beetham, Car-
valho, Landman, & Weir, 2008; Landman, 2013). But be-
yond this basic consensus, there are many varieties of
democracy (see Coppedge, Lindberg, & Skaaning, 2016)
or ‘democracy with adjectives’ (Collier & Levitsky, 1997)
that have been in use by scholars, practitioners and pol-
icy makers. These definitions can be grouped broadly
into three main types: (1) procedural democracy, (2) lib-
eral democracy, and (3) social democracy, the delin-
eation of which largely rests on the variable incorpora-
tion of different rights protections alongside the general
commitment to popular sovereignty and collective de-
cision making. Understanding these different types of
democracy and the degree to which they incorporate
different categories of human rights affects the ways
in which measures of both can and have been used
for empirical research (Dooresnspleet, 2015; Landman,
2013, 2016; Landman & Carvalho, 2009, 2017; Land-
man & Häusermann, 2003). Absence of consideration of
these lines of overlap has led to conceptual and empiri-
cal confusion in the literature on democracy and human
rights, as well as in those studies that incorporate mea-
sures of either concept in their modelling strategies (see
Munck, 2009).
Procedural definitions of democracy aremost closely
aligned with Robert Dahl’s (1971) formulation in Pol-
yarchy and include the two dimensions of contestation
and participation. Contestation captures the uncertain
peaceful competition necessary for democratic rule; a
principle which presumes the legitimacy of a significant
and organised opposition, the right to challenge incum-
bents, protection of the twin freedoms of expression and
association, the existence of free and fair elections, and
a consolidated political party system. Such a procedural
definition of democracy can be considered a baseline set
of conditions and a minimum threshold that can be used
to assess and count the number of democracies in the
world (see, e.g. Banks, 1971; Landman, 2013, pp. 3–5;
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000).
Liberal definitions of democracy preserve the no-
tions of contestation and participation found in proce-
dural definitions, but add more explicit references to
the protection of certain human rights. Definitions of lib-
eral democracy thus contain an institutional dimension
and a rights dimension (see Foweraker & Krznaric, 2000).
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The institutional dimension captures the idea of popular
sovereignty, and includes notions of accountability, con-
straint of leaders, representation of citizens, and univer-
sal participation in ways that are consistent with Dahl’s
‘polyarchy’ model outlined above. The rights dimension
is upheld by the rule of law, and includes civil, politi-
cal, property, and minority rights. Such a definition is ar-
guably richer (or ‘thicker’) as it includes legal constraints
on the exercise of power to complement the popular el-
ements in the derivation of and accountability for power
(Coppedge, 2012, pp. 17–33).
Social definitions of democracy maintain the institu-
tional and rights dimensions found in liberal models of
democracy but expand the types of rights that ought
to be protected, including social, economic and cultural
rights (although some of these are included in minority
rights protection seen in liberal definitions) (Beetham,
1999; Brandal, Bratberg, & Thorsen, 2013; Doorenspleet,
2005; Landman, 2005, 2013, 2016; Macpherson, 1973;
Przeworski, 1985; Sørensen, 1993). This expanded form
of democracy, extends ‘the democratic principle from
the political to the social, in effect primarily economic,
realm’ (Przeworski, 1985, p. 7). In the terms deployed
here, the concept of social democracy thus includes the
provision of social and economic welfare and the pro-
gressive realisation of economic and social rights. It could
also be argued that it includes the protection of cultural
rights, which are concerned with such issues as mother
tongue language, ceremonial land rights, and intellectual
property rights relating to cultural practices (e.g. indige-
nous healing practices and remedies that may be of in-
terest to multinational companies).
In theirmodernmanifestation, human rights have be-
come an accepted legal and normative standard through
which to judge the quality of human dignity (Landman
& Carvalho, 2009). This standard has arisen through the
concerted efforts of thousands of people over many
years inspired by a simple set of ideas that have be-
come codified through the mechanism of public interna-
tional law and realized through the domestic legal frame-
works and governmental institutions of states around the
world (Landman, 2005a, 2005b; Landman & Carvalho,
2009). While the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights makes reference to the right to take part in gov-
ernment (including through direct or indirect represen-
tatives, equal access to public services, and through peri-
odic elections), the non-binding nature of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights along with a paucity of spe-
cific reference to democracy itself in subsequent inter-
national human rights instruments, means that human
rights as such have been more legally codified through
international human rights law than democracy.
According legal recognition to the moral claim of hu-
man rights through international law means that states
are legally obliged to ensure that they respect, protect,
and fulfil these claims (see, e.g. Koch, 2005). There is
no corresponding legal obligation to respect, protect,
and fulfil democracy in the same way as there is for
rights, which provides a stronger foundation and core
content for human rights than for democracy. As we shall
see empirically, however, democracy is a form of gov-
ernment that appears superior to other forms of gov-
ernment for protecting, respecting and fulfilling human
rights obligations. Respecting human rights requires the
state to refrain from violating them. Protecting human
rights requires the state to prevent the violation of hu-
man rights by ‘third’ parties, such as private companies,
non-governmental organisations, paramilitary and insur-
gency groups, and ‘uncivil’ or undemocratic movements
(see Payne, 2000). Fulfilling human rights requires the
states to invest in and implement policies for the progres-
sive realisation of human rights (Koch, 2005; Landman &
Carvalho, 2009; Landman & Kersten, 2016).
Civil and political rights protect the ‘personhood’ of
individuals and their ability to participate in the public ac-
tivities of their countries. Economic, social and cultural
rights provide individuals with access to economic re-
sources, social opportunities for growth and the enjoy-
ment of their distinct ways of life, as well as protection
from the arbitrary loss of these rights. Solidarity rights
seek to guarantee for individuals access to public goods
like development and the environment, and some have
begun to argue, the benefits of global economic develop-
ment (Freeman, 2017; Landman, 2006; Landman & Car-
valho, 2009). Taken together, there are now a large num-
ber of human rights that have been formally codified,
which can be enumerated from the different treaties that
have been designed to protect them.
In following Beetham (1999, p. 94) and the brief
discussion of democracy and human rights, it is clear
that different conceptions of democracy vary precisely
around the question of the degree of overlap and inter-
action between the institutional and rights dimensions.
Beetham (1999, p. 94) visualises this overlap as a Venn di-
agram with democracy in one circle and human rights in
another, where different definitions and conceptualisa-
tions of democracy necessarily reflect smaller and larger
degrees of overlap (see Figure 1). Thin or procedural def-
initions of democracy afford less space for human rights
than thicker or social definitions, while it may be possi-
ble to conceive of some attributes of human rights sitting
outside the conceptual space of democracy. By think-
ing of the association between democracy and human
rights in this way, Beetham (1999) avoids the problem
that democracy and human rights might be construed as
mutually constitutive of one another while retaining the
notion that they are ‘inter-dependent and mutually re-
inforcing’ (United Nations, 1993). Hill (2016) makes the
case that respect for personal integrity is a sine qua non
for the existence of democracy and argues that democ-
racy and human rights are thus mutually constitutive. In
the terms set out here, however, Hill’s (2016) argument
only focuses on physical integrity rights, which means
that his conception of democracy sees a permanent over-
lap between the institutional dimension of democracy
and this more limited set of human rights, which typi-
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Figure 1. Definitions of democracy (adapted from Beetham, 1999, p. 94).
cally include freedom from torture, arbitrary detention,
extra-judicial killing, and exile (see Poe & Tate, 1994). It
is not clear from the literature on democracy or human
rights that human rights beyond this more limited set
are indeed necessarily part of the concept of democracy.
Where Hill (2016) is correct is with respect to the endo-
geneity problem in the empirical analysis of the relation-
ship between democracy and human rights as we shall
see in subsequent discussions below.
The possibility of different definitions and different
degrees of overlap necessarily affects the ways in which
both concepts are measured and analysed (Coppedge,
2012); however, there has not been much discussion
about this particular issue in themeasurement literature
(see Munck, 2009), since there are discussions on the
measurement of democracy or human rights, but not
democracy and human rights. Moreover, discussions of
the measurement of democracy, as well as the empir-
ical operationalisation of democracy include measures
that are arguably more about human rights than democ-
racy per se. For example, in her review of existing mea-
sures of democracy, Dorenspleet (2015) includes scales
produced by Freedom House, where the checklists for
at least one of the scales focuses almost exclusively on
human rights. Helliwell (1994) combines these two Free-
dom House measures arithmetically and calls the combi-
nation an ‘index of democracy’, amovewhich necessarily
commits him to a specific concept of democracy and in-
clusion of somehuman rights but not all. These andother
tensions in the measurement of democracy and human
rights are discussed in turn.
3. Measurement Strategies
The measurement of democracy and human rights has
progressed significantly since the early modernization lit-
erature as seen in the seminal studies from Seymour
Martin Lipset (1959) on the world and Daniel Lerner
(1958) on the Middle East. Simple dichotomous coding
schemes, although still adopted in some cross-national
research (Przeworski et al., 2000) have givenway tomore
complex formats that that seek to capture different di-
mensions of democracy (Coppedge et al., 2016) and an
expanding set of human rights categories beyond civil
and political rights to include economic and social rights
(Fukuda-Parr, Lawson-Remer, & Randolph, 2015; Land-
man, 2002, 2006; Landman & Carvalho, 2009; Landman
& Häuserman, 2003; Landman & Kersten, 2016). This de-
velopment inmeasures has also included an expansion in
the different types of data used to measure the two con-
cepts, including events data, standards data, survey data,
socio-economic and administrative data, and increas-
ingly, so-called ‘big’ data (Landman & Kersten, 2016).
3.1. Events
Events-based data answer the important questions of
what happened, when it happened, and who was in-
volved, and then report descriptive and numerical sum-
maries of the events. For human rights, counting such
events and violations involves identifying the various
acts of commission and omission that constitute or lead
to human rights violations, such as extra-judicial killings,
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arbitrary arrest, or torture. Such data tend to be disag-
gregated to the level of the violation itself, which may
have related data units such as the perpetrator, the vic-
tim, and the witness (Ball, Spirer, & Spirer, 2000; Land-
man, 2006, pp. 82–83; Seybolt, Aronson, & Fischoff,
2013). Events data are used less frequently in research
on democracy, but Lindberg (2006) used the number of
elections as an indicator of the growth of democracy in
Africa alongside other attributes of democracy. Other
democratic events can include transitions from authori-
tarian rule as in the large literature on ‘waves’ of democ-
racy (see Doorenspleet, 2005; Huntington, 1991; Land-
man, 2013; Landman & Carvalho, 2017). In his work on
democratic performance, Lijphart (1994, 1999, 2012) in-
corporates a number of events data to judge the relative
merits of consensus and majoritarian democracies, but
these events are not ‘democratic’ per se. Rather, they
are measures of government performance more gener-
ally and are hypothesised as areas of performance that
should be (1) superior among democracies and (2) dif-
ferentiated between consensus and majoritarian forms
of democracy.
3.2. Standards
Standards-based measures of democracy and human
rights are one level removed from event counting
and/or violation reporting and merely apply an ordi-
nal scale to qualitative information, where the resulting
scale is derived from determining whether the reported
democratic or human rights situation reaches particular
threshold conditions. Standards-based scales have been
the workhorse of cross-national research in compara-
tive politics, development studies, international political
economy, and international relations. One of the ma-
jor challenges with standards-based scales has been the
multiplicity of their use, where such scales are used as
measures of democracy, human rights, the ‘repressive-
ness of the regime’, the rule of law, and ‘good gover-
nance’ (Foweraker & Landman, 1997; Landman, 2005a;
Landman & Hauserman, 2003; Muller & Seligson, 1987).
There has been a hasty and particular readiness to use
such measures without careful reflection on the con-
cepts that underpin them, the attributes that inform
their coding, and the potential overlaps between democ-
racy and human rights that arise (see also Munck, 2009).
There are prominent examples of standards-based
measures of democracy. In the Cross-Polity Time-Series
Data Archive, Arthur S. Banks provided standards-based
scales of different institutional attributes of democracy
(see Foweraker & Landman, 1997). The scales were
coded for the presence of these attributes and can be
totalled for a democracy score that measures the nar-
row form of procedural democracy. The Polity IV data set
provides standards-based measures of different demo-
cratic attributes, and focusses on the constraints on the
regulation, openness and competitiveness of the execu-
tive branch, alongside constraints on the executive and
the regulation and competitiveness of participation. Like
Banks, these different attributes can be analysed sepa-
rately (see Buena de Mesquita, Downs, Smith, & Cherif,
2003) or used together to form a scale that ranges
from autocracy to democracy (Marshall, Gurr, & Jag-
gers, 2016). In similar fashion, the ‘scale of polyarchy’
(Coppedge & Reinicke, 1988) indicators of freedom of ex-
pression, freedom of organization, media pluralism, and
the holding of fair elections; where this approach has in-
fluenced the approach taken in the much expanded ‘va-
rieties of democracy’ project.
For human rights, the most prominent standards-
based examples include the Freedom House scales of
civil and political liberties (Gastil, 1980; www.freedom
house.org), the ‘political terror scale’ (Poe & Tate,
1994), a scale of torture (Hathaway, 2002), and a se-
ries of seventeen different rights measures collected by
Cingranelli and Richards (www.humanrightsdata.com).
Freedom House has a standard checklist it uses to code
civil and political rights based on press reports and coun-
try sources about state practices and then derives two
separate scales for each category of rights that range
from 1 (full protection) to 7 (full violation). The political
terror scale ranges from 1 (full protection) to 5 (full vi-
olation) for state practices that include torture, political
imprisonment, unlawful killing, and disappearance. Infor-
mation for these scales comes from the US State Depart-
ment and Amnesty International country reports. In sim-
ilar fashion, Hathaway (2002) measures torture on a 1
to 5 scale using information from the US State Depart-
ment. The Cingranelli and Richards human rights data
codes similar sets of rights on scales from 0 to 2, and 0
to 3, with some combined indices ranging from 0 to 8,
where higher scores denote better rights protections. In
addition to a series of civil and political rights, Cingranelli
and Richards also provide measures for such rights as
women’s economic, social, and political rights, worker
rights, and religious rights.
One of the key issues that emerged concerning these
human rights scales has been the level of awareness in
general about human rights and whether an increased
awareness and expectation of accountability for human
rights violations would increase the reporting of obser-
vations of human rights and thus make the world appear
worse off over time than was actually the case. Christo-
pher Fariss (2014) addresses this issue head on through
the use of item-response theory (IRT) and applies it to
existing human rights scales. The intuition behind the
item-response theory is that discerning the location of
a country on the scale involves a judgment about the de-
gree towhich a countrymeets the threshold condition to
move it from one category in the scale to the next. Fariss
(2014) finds that when the scales are readjusted for this
process of discernment and raised expectation about hu-
man rights accountability the overall picture of human
rights remains positive over time. Even though the world
is more conscious of human rights (itself a function of
successful advocacy by human rights organisations), the
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underlying trends in human rights abuse over the last
three decades have seen a gradual improvement.
3.3. Surveys
There are countless survey projects on democracy, in
terms of electoral studies and public attitudes, support
for democracy, support for democratic institutions, satis-
factionwith democracy and voter intention among other
dimensions of democracy. Large survey projects like the
World Values Survey and the ‘Barometer’ projects for Eu-
rope, Africa, Latin America and Asia have all used ran-
dom samples and structured survey frameworks that
have been used for primary and secondary analysis
of citizen attitudes across wide range of concerns rel-
evant to democracy. In addition to random sample
approaches, there are ‘expert judgement’ surveys on
democracy, such as the electoral integrity project (Norris,
2017), the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (www.bti-
project.org) and the Varieties of Democracy project (see,
e.g., Lührmann, Lindberg, & Tannenberg, 2017).
Household surveys have been used to provide
measures for popular attitudes about rights and to
uncover direct and indirect experiences of human
rights violations. Some of the most notable work has
been carried out by the NGO Physicians for Human
Rights, which conducts surveys of ‘at risk’ populations
(e.g. internally displaced people or women in con-
flict) to determine the nature and degree of human
rights violations (www.physiciansforhumanrights.org).
The ‘minorities at risk’ project certainly captures the
degree to which communal groups and other na-
tional minorities suffer different forms of discrimination
(www.mar.umd.edu). In addition, truth commissions,
such as East Timor (www.chegareport.net) and Sierra
Leone (www.sierraleonetrc.org) have carried out retro-
spective household mortality surveys on all deaths and
illnesses during the periods under investigation. These
surveys are then used alongside events data in ways that
allow for better estimations of the total number of peo-
ple killed or disappeared during periods of conflict, oc-
cupation, or authoritarian rule. In similar fashion, Ander-
son, Paskeviciute, Sandovici and Tverdova (2005) use sur-
vey data alongside standards-based measures of human
rights to compare the perceptions and attitudes on hu-
man rights in Eastern Europe to reported human rights
conditions (see Landman & Carvalho, 2009, pp. 91–106).
3.4. Socio-Economic and Administrative Statistics
Administrative and socio-economic statistics produced
by national statistical offices or recognized international
governmental organizations have been increasingly seen
as useful sources of data for the indirect measure of hu-
man rights, or as indicators for rights-based approaches
to different sectors, such as justice, health, education,
and welfare. Government statistical agencies and inter-
governmental organizations produce a variety of socio-
economic statistics that can be used to approximate
measures of human rights. For example, academic and
policy research has used aggregate measures of devel-
opment as proxy measures for the progressive realiza-
tion of social and economic rights. Such aggregate mea-
sures include the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI),
the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Social Eco-
nomic Rights Fulfilment Index (SERF Index). the SERF In-
dex (www.serfindex.org) measures on a 0 to 100 scale
the extent to which states fulfil their obligations under
the right to food (infant height and weight), the right to
education (primary school completion, gross school en-
rolment, average math and science PISA score), the right
to health (contraceptive prevalence, life expectancy, in-
fant mortality), the right to housing (improved access
to sanitation and water), and the right to work (poverty
headcount, long-term unemployment, relative poverty)
in relation to countries’ maximum available resources.
The World Bank’s governance indicators have col-
lated a panoply of different indicators from which six
main dimensions of governance are derived (Kaufmann,
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009). Tatu Vanhanen has dedicated
his life’s research to the growth and development of
democracy and his main measure the Index of Democ-
ratization is comprised of ‘objective’ measures of his key
dimensions of democracy that draw on Dahl (1971): par-
ticipation and competition. For participation, he uses the
official electoral turnout of the population. For compe-
tition, he uses the size of the smallest political party in
the legislative chamber. His index then multiplies these
two dimensions, which he argues captures the essence
of democracy (see, e.g. Vanhanen, 2003).
More interestingly, Foweraker & Krznaric (2003) use
different official statistics to differentiate democratic per-
formance of established democracies in the West. They
argue that extant measures of democracy like the Polity
IV measure provide very little indication of the varia-
tion in established democracies, and lead to the conclu-
sion that these democracies and their performance are
both uniform and superior to other new and restored
democracies (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2003, p. 314). They
show that these established democracies are not nec-
essarily uniform, and that there are deficiencies in civil
and minority rights protections, such as women’s repre-
sentation, equal access to the law, and political discrimi-
nation against minorities, as well as disproportionately
high incarceration rates (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2003,
p. 327). These problem areas are particularly acute in the
US, the UK and Australia (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2003,
pp. 327–332), while their overall conclusions shed con-
siderable insight into the variation in well-established
democracies particularly in the realm of human rights
(see below).
3.5. New Forms of Data
In addition to the continued development and refine-
ment of these existing measurement strategies, there
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are new trends in data collection that make use of the
‘democratization of technology’ that has taken place
more or less during the first decade of the twenty-first
century. The rise of social media and the increasing avail-
ability of smartphones and other mobile devices has
led to a revolution in the ability of individual people to
have a voice in ways that were hitherto not possible.
User-generated content on the Internet, in the form of
‘tweets’, YouTube videos, SMS alert networks, and other
platforms of information dissemination, have created a
volume of information on country conditions that is be-
ginning to transform the ability of political scientists and
other researchers to study human rights. The informa-
tion that is now available is ‘double edged’: on the one
hand, it provides the ability for grassroots reporting and
narrative accounts of real time events as they unfold,
and on the other hand, it provides ‘meta data’ on the
events themselves, as smart technology often contains
automatic functions that include the date, time and loca-
tion that something has happened (typically through em-
bedded ‘global positioning system’ technology, or GPS).
The combination of real time data and meta data al-
lows for collection, fusion, and visualization of democ-
racy and human rights events across space and time, of-
ten at the ‘street corner’ level of accuracy. The collec-
tion of these kinds of data occurs in two ways: (1) ‘crowd
sourcing’ through specialized data collection ‘portals’
such as the platform made available through Ushahidi
(www.ushahidi.com), or (2) collection of data from al-
ready existing ‘open data’ sources, such as Facebook,
Twitter, news media, and NGO reporting, among others.
In their raw form, the data are not particularly useful,
but, through fusing different sources intowell-structured
data bases that conform to the ‘who did what to whom’
understanding of human rights violations, they can be
used for human rights assessments of countries. More-
over, since the meta data may contain additional infor-
mation about date, time, and location of events, it is pos-
sible tomap violations on publicly availablemapping pro-
grammes, such as Google Maps.
4. Empirical Relationships
The theoretical connections and overlaps set out above
show that it is not unreasonable to expect strong empir-
ical relationships between democracy and human rights.
Democracies are meant to be based on the protection
of fundamental rights and thus there is an expectation
that human rights protections will be higher in democra-
cies than non-democracies or that the protection of hu-
man rights will co-varywith the level of democracy. Large
scale cross-national comparative analyses that specify
civil and political rights protection as the dependent vari-
able tend to use a narrow and procedural definition of
democracy as an independent variable (see, e.g. Land-
man, 2005a, 2005b; Landman& Carvalho, 2016;Mitchell
& McCormick, 1988; Poe & Tate, 1994) in an effort to
minimise the problemof endogeneity. Such studies show
that democracy and human rights are indeed positively
correlated with one another but not perfectly so. From
the first cross-national study by Mitchell & McCormick
(1988) to the latest pooled-cross section time-series
models on human rights protection, there is a significant
relationship between democracy and human rights.
For example, Table 1 shows the correlations between
democracy and human rights using a variety ofmeasures
across a different selection of country cases and time
(Landman, 2005a, p. 110, 2016, p. 144). The first row in
the table includes correlations for the Polity IV measure
of democracy and different measures of human rights
for a sample of 194 countries between 1976 and 2000,
which are all statistically significant and indicate varying
magnitudes in the relationship between democracy and
human rights. The negative signs for these correlations
are due to the fact the democracy scores are coded low
for non-democracy and high for full democracy, while
human rights scores (with the exception of Cingranelli
and Richards) are coded low for good human rights pro-
tection (or low levels of violation) and high for bad hu-
man rights protection (or high levels of violation). The
second row is a set of correlations for a sample of 21
Latin American countries between 1981 and 2010 (Land-
man, 2016, p. 144) using the same Polity IV variable and
a slightly different set of human rights measures, includ-
ing the Amnesty International derived Political Terror
Scale, US State Department derived Political Terror Scale,
and the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) physical integrity
rights scale.1 While all these correlations are significant
at the p< .001 level of significance, themagnitude varies
from relatively low values to high values suggesting that
Table 1. Correlations between democracy and human rights.
PTS PTS Civil Liberties Political Rights Torture Physical Integrity
(Amnesty) (US State) (F House) (F House) (Hathaway) (CIRI)
World −.36*** −.41*** −.85*** −.91*** −.34***
1976–20001 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Latin America −.27*** −.38*** .35***
1981–20102 (.000) (.000) (.000)
Notes: Pairwise correlations, p-values in parentheses, *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .001; Landman (2005a, 2016, p. 144).
1 The coding for this scale is the inverse of what is used across the other scales and thus is positively correlated with the Polity IV measure of democracy.
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democracy and human rights certainly co-vary, but not
perfectly so.
This variation in themagnitude of the relationship be-
tween the particular measure of democracy and these
different human rights measures suggests several things.
First, these measures are indeed measuring different
things. The Polity IV measure primarily captures the in-
stitutional dimension of democracy, while the human
rights measures focus on a narrow set of physical in-
tegrity rights (the Political Terror Scale and the CIRI scale)
and torture (Hathaway, 2002) or on broader sets of civil
and political rights (Freedom House), where there is
much more conceptual (and therefore empirical) over-
lap between democracy and human rights. Indeed, the
coding checklists for the Freedom House measures in-
clude attributes most commonly associated with democ-
racy. Second, the gap between democracy and human
rights evident in correlations that are less than a per-
fect 1 capture the notion of what Larry Diamond (1999)
and Fareed Zakaria (2003) have called ‘illiberal democ-
racies’, where it is perfectly possible for democracies
to hold elections, have peaceful transfers of power be-
tween civilian leaders, and functioning legislatures while
at the same time being unable to prevent the violation
of certain human rights (see Beetham et al., 2008; Land-
man, 2016). To demonstrate this point further, it is pos-
sible to combine standards-based measures of civil and
political rights seen in Table 1 above into a single factor
score and then plot this factor score against the Polity IV
measure of democracy. There are strong and significant
factor loadings ranging from .684 to .909 for each of five
measures of human rights on a single extracted factor
component that is common to all measure (see Landman
& Larizza, 2009, p. 721). Figure 2 shows a scatter plot be-
tween the Polity IV measure of democracy and this hu-
man rights factor (see Landman, 2013, p. 39; Landman,
Kernohan, & Gohdes, 2012; Landman & Larizza, 2009),
where it is clear that there is a positive and significant re-
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lationship between the two measures (captured by the
fitted line). It is also evident from Figure 2 that there is
a significant number of countries that would qualify as
‘illiberal democracies’ sitting in the lower right quadrant
(e.g. Brazil, India, the Philippines, and Colombia). These
countries score relatively high on democracy but rela-
tively low on their ability to protect human rights. Third,
the significant relationships can also be down to an ele-
ment of human rights sitting within measures of democ-
racy. Indeed, Hill (2016) has shown that democracy mea-
sures such as Polity IV have certain limited elements of
human rights in them, rendering some empirical analysis
between democracy and human rights spurious.
Beyond the relationship between democracy and
civil and political rights, Fukuda-Parr et al. (2015,
pp. 131–135) show that democracies have amuch better
record of fulfilling social and economic rights. Their So-
cial and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index ranges
from 0 (no fulfilment) to 100 (expected fulfilment). They
show that the 5th Quintile democracies (using the Polity
IV measure of democracy) have a mean score on fulfill-
ing social and economic rights of 80.92 with a low of
56.06 and a high of 94.05, where this range is signifi-
cantly better than for lower scoring democracies and au-
tocracies (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2015, p. 132). These posi-
tive relationships for Polity IV and SERF are also upheld
for the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators
on ‘Voice and Accountability’ and ‘Rule of Law’, and the
Freedom House scales of political rights and civil liber-
ties (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2015, pp. 132–133). For my own
work on Latin America across 21 republics for the pe-
riod 1980–2010, the SERF index is positively correlated
with the Polity IV measure of democracy (Kendall’s Tau
B = .241, p < .000) (Landman, 2016, pp. 144). Again, as
in the relationships between democracy and civil and po-
litical rights, the fulfilment of social and economic rights
is a function of more than just democracy, and that any
relationship is not perfectly correlated. Rather, variation
in democracy accounts for some of the variation in social
and economic rights fulfilment.
The empirical relationship between democracy and
human rights is highly variegated and dependent more
on the definitions of democracy that are adopted than
human rights, since human rights have been formally ar-
ticulated through international and domestic law in ways
that democracy has not.While there are no agreed philo-
sophical foundations for the existence of human rights,
the law of human rights across domestic, regional and
international jurisdictions, as well as the jurisprudence
that accompany it have provided what human rights
lawyers call ‘core content’ of rights and their obligations.
It is this core content and articulation of state obligations
that in my view represent a ‘systematized concepts’ (Ad-
cock & Collier, 2001) that can be operationalized through
the different types of data discussed here. In contrast,
the concept of democracy relies only on political the-
ory and political philosophy for its core content and has
not been ‘legalized’ in the same way as human rights
(Meckled-Garcia, 2005). As we have seen, definitions of
democracy vary considerably and variously include differ-
ent sets of human rights. The positive and significant re-
lationship between democracy and human rights attests
to their complementarity, while the remaining gap in the
relationship between them confirms that they are differ-
ent from one another.
The utilization of measures for empirical analysis
needs to be consistent in setting out what is (or is to
be) measured, compared, and analysed; where any use
of measures must be as closely linked to the concepts
that they purport to measure. This linkage between
concepts and measures involve significant trade-offs be-
tween complexity, viability, and validity (Landman & Car-
valho, 2009, pp. 24–30). It can be argued that there is
a direct and negative relationship between conceptual
complexity and measurement viability. Complex concep-
tual frameworks for measuring democracy and human
rights might reduce viability, as complexity raises cost
and faces challenges of data availability and accessibility.
The four different types of data outlined here—events,
standards, surveys, socio-economic and administrative—
can and have been variously to capture part or most of
each concept depending on the purpose of the empirical
analysis (Landman & Carvalho, 2009, p. 29).
5. Challenges and Opportunities
Democracy and human rights are complex, multi-faceted
and multi-dimensional concepts that are not mutually
exclusive from one another. Definitions of democracy
variously include both institutional dimensions that con-
strain executives, separate power and authority, and pro-
vide mechanisms for accountability, as well as rights di-
mensions that provide fundamental protections that al-
low individuals and groups to aggregate their interests,
articulate those interests, shield themselves from arbi-
trary abuses of power, and enjoy the ability to exercise
freedom and agency in their public and private lives. The
first and crucial step in any systematic effort to compare,
measure, and analyse democracy and human rights is to
provide precise and coherent definitions of the concepts
to be measured and analysed, the boundary conditions
for them, and the attributes that comprise them.
It for the reasons of complexity, multi-dimensionality,
and variable overlap between democracy and human
rights that measurement strategies have been difficult,
challenging, and evolving. Different attributes of democ-
racy and human rights can be delineated through dif-
ferent indicators, which can yield different ‘scores on
units’ (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 201) that vary across
space and over time. Many of these attributes and di-
mensions are observable, while many are not, where
lateral methods, proxy measures, and ‘latent class’ ana-
lytical techniques and probabilistic inferential statistics
(such as multiple systems estimation, or MSE) are re-
quired. Overt elements of democracy and human rights
such as elections and violations can be observed and
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counted, while many aspects suffer from what the late
Will Moore calls ‘the fundamental problem of unobserv-
ability’, where practices, actions, choices, and interper-
sonal interactions take place behind closed doors and in
secret locations.
The scholarly and practitioner communities working
on democracy and human rights havemade great strides
in developing increasingly nuanced and effective mea-
surement strategies that have captured more of the in-
herent complexity and multi-dimensionality of democ-
racy and human rights. Events-based data, standards-
based data, survey-based data, and socio-economic and
administrative statistics are being used in increasingly
creative and systematic ways to capture the temporal
and spatial variation in democracy and human rights.
From Lipset’s (1959) original polychotomous coding to
the latest release of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)
data set, there have been great strides made in the
measurement and analysis of democracy, the quality of
democracy, and democratic performance. From the early
work of Gastil to the latest analysis fromFariss (2014) and
the Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG), there
have been significant advances in the measurement and
analysis of human rights (see www.hrdag.org).
Despite these many advances, however, many chal-
lenges remain. First, there is still the need towork onhow
democracy and human rights are defined and how those
aspects that are unique to each are circumscribed, while
greater attention is given to the different ways in which
democracy and human rights overlap with one another
and how they are related to one another. Second, the
specification of systematic definitions of both concepts
is directly linked to the ways in which they are measured.
Third, there continues to be an over-reliance on subjec-
tive coding of subjective information collected on democ-
racy and human rights. Now more than ever, there are
increasing types of data being generated that can be har-
nessed and analysed inways that can enhance our under-
standing and explanation of the variation in democracy
and human rights. Big data techniques, machine learn-
ing and supervised machine learning, web scraping and
corpus linguistic analytical techniques offer new ways of
measuring, mapping, and understanding democracy and
human rights.
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